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Abstract
Recent work has developed methods for learning deep network classifiers that are
provably robust to norm-bounded adversarial perturbation; however, these methods
are currently only possible for relatively small feedforward networks. In this paper,
in an effort to scale these approaches to substantially larger models, we extend
previous work in three main directions. First, we present a technique for extending
these training procedures to much more general networks, with skip connections
(such as ResNets) and general nonlinearities; the approach is fully modular, and can
be implemented automatically (analogous to automatic differentiation). Second,
in the specific case of `∞ adversarial perturbations and networks with ReLU
nonlinearities, we adopt a nonlinear random projection for training, which scales
linearly in the number of hidden units (previous approaches scaled quadratically).
Third, we show how to further improve robust error through cascade models. On
both MNIST and CIFAR data sets, we train classifiers that improve substantially on
the state of the art in provable robust adversarial error bounds: from 5.8% to 3.1%
on MNIST (with `∞ perturbations of  = 0.1), and from 80% to 36.4% on CIFAR
(with `∞ perturbations of  = 2/255). Code for all experiments in the paper is
available at https://github.com/locuslab/convex_adversarial/.
1 Introduction
A body of recent work in adversarial machine learning has shown that it is possible to learn provably
robust deep classifiers [Wong and Kolter, 2017, Raghunathan et al., 2018, Dvijotham et al., 2018].
These are deep networks that are verifiably guaranteed to be robust to adversarial perturbations under
some specified attack model; for example, a certain robustness certificate may guarantee that for a
given example x, no perturbation ∆ with `∞ norm less than some specified  could change the class
label that the network predicts for the perturbed example x+ ∆. However, up until this point, such
provable guarantees have only been possible for reasonably small-sized networks. It has remained
unclear whether these methods could extend to larger, more representionally complex networks.
In this paper, we make substantial progress towards the goal of scaling these provably robust networks
to realistic sizes. Specifically, we extend the techniques of Wong and Kolter [2017] in three key ways.
First, while past work has only applied to pure feedforward networks, we extend the framework to
deal with arbitrary residual/skip connections (a hallmark of modern deep network architectures),
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and arbitrary activation functions (Dvijotham et al. [2018] also worked with arbitrary activation
functions, but only for feedforward networks, and just discusses network verification rather than
robust training). Second, and possibly most importantly, computing the upper bound on the robust
loss in [Wong and Kolter, 2017] in the worst case scales quadratically in the number of hidden units
in the network, making the approach impractical for larger networks. In this work, we use a nonlinear
random projection technique to estimate the bound in manner that scales only linearly in the size
of the hidden units (i.e., only a constant multiple times the cost of traditional training), and which
empirically can be used to train the networks with no degradation in performance from the previous
work. Third, we show how to further improve robust performance of these methods, though at the
expense of worse non-robust error, using multi-stage cascade models. Through these extensions, we
are able to improve substantially upon the verified robust errors obtained by past work.
2 Background and related work
Work in adversarial defenses typically falls in one of three primary categories. First, there is
ongoing work in developing heuristic defenses against adversarial examples: [Goodfellow et al.,
2015, Papernot et al., 2016, Kurakin et al., 2017, Metzen et al., 2017] to name a few. While this work
is largely empirical at this point, substantial progress has been made towards developing networks
that seem much more robust than previous approaches. Although a distressingly large number of
these defenses are quickly “broken” by more advanced attacks [Athalye et al., 2018], there have
also been some methods that have proven empirically resistant to the current suite of attacks; the
recent NIPS 2017 adversarial example challenge [Kurakin et al., 2018], for example, highlights some
of the progress made on developing classifiers that appear much stronger in practice than many of
the ad-hoc techniques developed in previous years. Many of the approaches, though not formally
verified in the strict sense during training, nonetheless have substantial theoretical justification for
why they may perform well: Sinha et al. [2018] uses properties of statistical robustness to develop an
approach that is not much more difficult to train and which empirically does achieve some measure
of resistance to attacks; Madry et al. [2017] considers robustness to a first-order adversary, and shows
that a randomized projected gradient descent procedure is optimal in this setting. Indeed, in some
cases the classifiers trained via these methods can be verified to be adversarially robust using the
verification techniques discussed below (though only for very small networks). Despite this progress,
we believe it is also crucially important to consider defenses that are provably robust, to avoid any
possible attack.
Second, our work in this paper relates closely to techniques for the formal verification of neural
networks systems (indeed, our approach can be viewed as a convex procedure for verification, coupled
with a method for training networks via the verified bounds). In this area, most past work focuses
on using exact (combinatorial) solvers to verify the robustness properties of networks, either via
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers [Huang et al., 2017, Ehlers, 2017, Carlini and Wagner,
2017] or integer programming approaches [Lomuscio and Maganti, 2017, Tjeng and Tedrake, 2017,
Cheng et al., 2017]. These methods have the benefit of being able to reason exactly about robustness,
but at the cost of being combinatorial in complexity. This drawback has so far prevented these
methods from effectively scaling to large models or being used within a training setting. There
have also been a number of recent attempts to verify networks using non-combinatorial methods
(and this current work fits broadly in this general area). For example, Gehr et al. [2018] develop
a suite of verification methods based upon abstract interpretations (these can be broadly construed
as relaxations of combinations of activations that are maintained as they pass through the network).
Dvijotham et al. [2018] use an approach based upon analytically solving an optimization problem
resulting from dual functions of the activations (which extends to activations beyond the ReLU).
However, these methods apply to simple feedforward architectures without skip connections, and
focus only on verification of existing networks.
Third, and most relevant to our current work, there are several approaches that go beyond provable
verification, and also integrate the verification procedure into the training of the network itself. For
example, Hein and Andriushchenko [2017] develop a formal bound for robustness to `2 perturbations
in two-layer networks, and train a surrogate of their bounds. Raghunathan et al. [2018] develop a
semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation of exact verification methods, and train a network by
minimizing this bound via the dual SDP. And Wong and Kolter [2017] present a linear-programming
(LP) based upper bound on the robust error or loss that can be suffered under norm-bounded
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perturbation, then minimize this upper bound during training; the method is particularly efficient
since they do not solve the LP directly, but instead show that it is possible to bound the LP optimal
value and compute elementwise bounds on the activation functions based on a backward pass through
the network. However, it is still the case that none of these approaches scale to realistically-sized
networks; even the approach of [Wong and Kolter, 2017], which empirically has been scaled to the
largest settings of all the above approaches, in the worst case scales quadratically in the number of
hidden units in the network and dimensions in the input. Thus, all the approaches so far have been
limited to relatively small networks and problems such as MNIST.
Contributions This paper fits into this third category of integrating verification into training, and
makes substantial progress towards scaling these methods to realistic settings. While we cannot yet
reach e.g. ImageNet scales, even in this current work, we show that it is possible to overcome the
main hurdles to scalability of past approaches. Specifically, we develop a provably robust training
procedure, based upon the approach in [Wong and Kolter, 2017], but extending it in three key ways.
The resulting method: 1) extends to general networks with skip connections, residual layers, and
activations besides the ReLU; we do so by using a general formulation based on the Fenchel conjugate
function of activations; 2) scales linearly in the dimensionality of the input and number of hidden
units in the network, using techniques from nonlinear random projections, all while suffering minimal
degradation in accuracy; and 3) further improves the quality of the bound with model cascades. We
describe each of these contributions in the next section.
3 Scaling provably robust networks
3.1 Robust bounds for general networks via modular dual functions
This section presents an architecture for constructing provably robust bounds for general deep network
architectures, using Fenchel duality. Importantly, we derive the dual of each network operation in a
fully modular fashion, simplifying the problem of deriving robust bounds of a network to bounding
the dual of individual functions. By building up a toolkit of dual operations, we can automatically
construct the dual of any network architecture by iterating through the layers of the original network.
The adversarial problem for general networks We consider a generalized k “layer” neural
network fθ : R|x| → R|y| given by the equations
zi =
i−1∑
j=1
fij(zj), for i = 2, . . . , k (1)
where z1 = x, fθ(x) ≡ zk (i.e., the output of the network) and fij : R|zj | → R|zi| is some function
from layer j to layer i. Importantly, this differs from prior work in two key ways. First, unlike the
conjugate forms found in Wong and Kolter [2017], Dvijotham et al. [2018], we no longer assume
that the network consists of linear operations followed by activation functions, and instead opt to
work with an arbitrary sequence of k functions. This simplifies the analysis of sequential non-linear
activations commonly found in modern architectures, e.g. max pooling or a normalization strategy
followed by a ReLU,1 by analyzing each activation independently, whereas previous work would
need to analyze the entire sequence as a single, joint activation. Second, we allow layers to depend
not just on the previous layer, but also on all layers before it. This generalization applies to networks
with any kind of skip connections, e.g. residual networks and dense networks, and greatly expands
the set of possible architectures.
Let B(x) ⊂ R|x|, represent some input constraint for the adversary. For this section we will focus
on an arbitrary norm ball B(x) = {x + ∆ : ‖∆‖ ≤ }. This is the constraint set considered for
norm-bounded adversarial perturbations, however other constraint sets can certainly be considered.
Then, given an input example x, a known label y∗, and a target label ytarg, the problem of finding the
most adversarial example within B (i.e., a so-called targeted adversarial attack) can be written as
minimize
zk
cT zk, subject to zi =
i−1∑
j=1
fij(zj), for i = 2, . . . , k, z1 ∈ B(x) (2)
1Batch normalization, since it depends on entire minibatches, is formally not covered by the approach, but it
can be approximated by considering the scaling and shifting to be generic parameters, as is done at test time.
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where c = ey? − eytarg .
Dual networks via compositions of modular dual functions To bound the adversarial problem,
we look to its dual optimization problem using the machinery of Fenchel conjugate functions [Fenchel,
1949], described in Definition 1.
Definition 1. The conjugate of a function f is another function f∗ defined by
f∗(y) = max
x
xT y − f(x) (3)
Specifically, we can lift the constraint zi+1 =
∑i
j=1 fij(zj) from Equation 2 into the objective with
an indicator function, and use conjugate functions to obtain a lower bound. For brevity, we will use
the subscript notation (·)1:i = ((·)1, . . . , (·)i), e.g. z1:i = (z1, . . . , zi). Due to the skip connections,
the indicator functions are not independent, so we cannot directly conjugate each individual indicator
function. We can, however, still form its dual using the conjugate of a different indicator function
corresponding to the backwards direction, as shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Let the indicator function for the ith constraint be
χi(z1:i) =
{
0 if zi =
∑i−1
j=1 fij(zj)
∞ otherwise, (4)
for i = 2, . . . , k, and consider the joint indicator function
∑k
i=2 χi(z1:i). Then, the joint indicator is
lower bounded by maxν1:k ν
T
k zk − νT1 z1 −
∑k−1
i=1 χ
∗
i (−νi, νi+1:k), where
χ∗i (νi:k) = max
zi
νTi zi +
k∑
j=i+1
νTj fji(zi) (5)
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Note that χ∗i (νi:k) is the exact conjugate of the indicator for the set {xi:k :
xj = fji(xi) ∀j > i}, which is different from the set indicated by χi. However, when
there are no skip connections (i.e. zi only depends on zi−1), χ∗i is exactly the conjugate of χi.
We defer the proof of Lemma 1 to Appendix A.1. With structured upper bounds on these conjugate
functions, we can bound the original adversarial problem using the dual network described in Theorem
1. We can then optimize the bound using any standard deep learning toolkit using the same robust
optimization procedure as in Wong and Kolter [2017] but using our bound instead. This amounts to
minimizing the loss evaluated on our bound of possible network outputs under perturbations, as a
drop in replacement for the traditional network output. For the adversarial setting, note that the `∞
perturbation results in a dual norm of `1.
Theorem 1. Let gij and hi be any functions such that
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k) ≤ hi(νi:k) subject to νi =
k∑
j=i+1
gij(νj) (6)
for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. Then, the adversarial problem from Equation 2 is lower bounded by
J(x, ν1:k) = −νT1 x− ‖ν1‖∗ −
k−1∑
i=1
hi(νi:k) (7)
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm, and ν1:k = g(c) is the output of a k layer neural network g on input c,
given by the equations
νk = −c, νi =
k−1∑
j=i
gij(νj+1), for i = 1, . . . , k − 1. (8)
We denote the upper bound on the conjugate function from Equation 6 a dual layer, and defer the
proof to Appendix A.2. To give a concrete example, we present two possible dual layers for linear
operators and ReLU activations in Corollaries 1 and 2 (their derivations are in Appendix B), and we
also depict an example dual residual block in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: An example of the layers forming a typical residual block (left) and its dual (right), using
the dual layers described in Corollaries 1 and 2. Note that the bias terms of the residual network go
into the dual objective and are not part of the structure of the dual network, and the skip connections
remain in the dual network but go in the opposite direction.
Corollary 1. The dual layer for a linear operator zˆi+1 = Wizi + bi is
χ∗i (νi:k) = ν
T
i+1bi subject to νi = W
T
i νi+1. (9)
Corollary 2. Suppose we have lower and upper bounds `ij , uij on the pre-activations. The dual
layer for a ReLU activation zˆi+1 = max(zi, 0) is
χ∗i (νi:k) ≤ −
∑
j∈Ii
`i,j [νij ]+ subject to νi = Diνi+1. (10)
where I−i , I+i , I denote the index sets where the bounds are negative, positive or spanning the origin
respectively, and where Di is a diagonal matrix with entries
(Di)jj =

0 j ∈ I−i
1 j ∈ I+i
ui,j
ui,j−`i,j j ∈ Ii
. (11)
We briefly note that these dual layers recover the original dual network described in Wong and Kolter
[2017]. Furthermore, the dual linear operation is the exact conjugate and introduces no looseness to
the bound, while the dual ReLU uses the same relaxation used in Ehlers [2017], Wong and Kolter
[2017]. More generally, the strength of the bound from Theorem 1 relies entirely on the tightness of
the individual dual layers to their respective conjugate functions in Equation 6. While any gij , hi can
be chosen to upper bound the conjugate function, a tighter bound on the conjugate results in a tighter
bound on the adversarial problem.
If the dual layers for all operations are linear, the bounds for all layers can be computed with a single
forward pass through the dual network using a direct generalization of the form used in Wong and
Kolter [2017] (due to their similarity, we defer the exact algorithm to Appendix F). By trading off
tightness of the bound with computational efficiency by using linear dual layers, we can efficiently
compute all bounds and construct the dual network one layer at a time. The end result is that we
can automatically construct dual networks from dual layers in a fully modular fashion, completely
independent of the overall network architecture (similar to how auto-differentiation tools proceed one
function at a time to compute all parameter gradients using only the local gradient of each function).
With a sufficiently comprehensive toolkit of dual layers, we can compute provable bounds on the
adversarial problem for any network architecture.
For other dual layers, we point the reader to two resources. For the explicit form of dual layers
for hardtanh, batch normalization, residual connections, we direct the reader to Appendix B. For
analytical forms of conjugate functions of other activation functions such as tanh, sigmoid, and max
pooling, we refer the reader to Dvijotham et al. [2018].
3.2 Efficient bound computation for `∞ perturbations via random projections
A limiting factor of the proposed algorithm and the work of Wong and Kolter [2017] is its computa-
tional complexity: for instance, to compute the bounds exactly for `∞ norm bounded perturbations in
ReLU networks, it is computationally expensive to calculate ‖ν1‖1 and
∑
j∈Ii `ij [νij ]+. In contrast
to other terms like νTi+1bi which require only sending a single bias vector through the dual network,
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Algorithm 1 Estimating ‖ν1‖1 and
∑
j∈I `ij [νij ]+
input: Linear dual network operations gij , projection dimension r, lower bounds `ij , dij from
Equation 13, layer-wise sizes |zi|
R
(1)
1 := Cauchy(r, |z1|) // initialize random matrix for `1 term
for i = 2, . . . , k do
// pass each term forward through the network
for j = 1, . . . , i− 1 do
R
(i)
j , S
(i)
j :=
∑i−1
k=1 g
T
ki(R
(k)
i ),
∑i−1
k=1 g
T
ki(S
(k)
i )
end for
R
(i)
i , S
(i)
i := diag(di)Cauchy(|zi|, r), di // initialize terms for layer i
end for
output: median(|R(k)1 |), 0.5
(
−median(|R(k)2 |) + S(k)2
)
, . . . , 0.5
(
−median(|R(k)k |) + S(k)k
)
the matrices ν1 and νi,Ii must be explicitly formed by sending an example through the dual network
for each input dimension and for each j ∈ Ii, which renders the entire computation quadratic in
the number of hidden units. To scale the method for larger, ReLU networks with `∞ perturbations,
we look to random Cauchy projections. Note that for an `2 norm bounded adversarial perturbation,
the dual norm is also an `2 norm, so we can use traditional random projections [Vempala, 2005].
Experiments for the `2 norm are explored further in Appendix H. However, for the remainder of this
section we focus on the `1 case arising from `∞ perturbations.
Estimating with Cauchy random projections From the work of Li et al. [2007], we can use the
sample median estimator with Cauchy random projections to directly estimate ‖ν1‖1 for linear dual
networks, and use a variation to estimate
∑
j∈I `ij [νij ]+, as shown in Theorem 2 (the proof is in
Appendix D.1).
Theorem 2. . Let ν1:k be the dual network from Equation 1 with linear dual layers and let r > 0 be
the projection dimension. Then, we can estimate
‖ν1‖1 ≈ median(|νT1 R|) (12)
where R is a |z1| × r standard Cauchy random matrix and the median is taken over the second axis.
Furthermore, we can estimate∑
j∈I
`ij [νij ]+ ≈ 1
2
(−median(|νTi diag(di)R|) + νTi di) , di,j = { ui,jui,j−`i,j j 6∈ Ii0 j ∈ Ii (13)
where R is a |zi| × r standard Cauchy random matrix, and the median is taken over the second axis.
This estimate has two main advantages: first, it is simple to compute, as evaluating νT1 R involves
passing the random matrix forward through the dual network (similarly, the other term requires
passing a modified random matrix through the dual network; the exact algorithm is detailed in 1).
Second, it is memory efficient in the backward pass, as the gradient need only propagate through the
median entries.
These random projections reduce the computational complexity of computing these terms to piping r
random Cauchy vectors (and an additional vector) through the network. Crucially, the complexity
is no longer a quadratic function of the network size: if we fix the projection dimension to some
constant r, then the computational complexity is now linear with the input dimension and Ii. Since
previous work was either quadratic or combinatorially expensive to compute, estimating the bound
with random projections is the fastest and most scalable approach towards training robust networks
that we are aware of. At test time, the bound can be computed exactly, as the gradients no longer need
to be stored. However, if desired, it is possible to use a different estimator (specifically, the geometric
estimator) for the `∞ norm to calculate high probability bounds on the adversarial problem, which is
discussed in Appendix E.1.
3.3 Bias reduction with cascading ensembles
A final major challenge of training models to minimize a robust bound on the adversarial loss, is that
the robustness penalty acts as a regularization. For example, in a two-layer ReLU network, the robust
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Table 1: Number of hidden units, parameters, and time per epoch for various architectures.
Model Dataset # hidden units # parameters Time (s) / epoch
Small MNIST 4804 166406 74
CIFAR 6244 214918 48
Large MNIST 28064 1974762 667
CIFAR 62464 2466858 466
Resnet MNIST 82536 3254562 2174
CIFAR 107496 4214850 1685
Table 2: Results on MNIST, and CIFAR10 with small networks, large networks, residual networks,
and cascaded variants.
Single model error Cascade error
Dataset Model Epsilon Robust Standard Robust Standard
MNIST Small, Exact 0.1 4.48% 1.26% - -
MNIST Small 0.1 4.99% 1.37% 3.13% 3.13%
MNIST Large 0.1 3.67% 1.08% 3.42% 3.18%
MNIST Small 0.3 43.10% 14.87% 33.64% 33.64%
MNIST Large 0.3 45.66% 12.61% 41.62% 35.24%
CIFAR10 Small 2/255 52.75% 38.91% 39.35% 39.35%
CIFAR10 Large 2/255 46.59% 31.28% 38.84% 36.08%
CIFAR10 Resnet 2/255 46.11% 31.72% 36.41% 35.93%
CIFAR10 Small 8/255 79.25% 72.24% 71.71% 71.71%
CIFAR10 Large 8/255 83.43% 80.56 79.24% 79.14%
CIFAR10 Resnet 8/255 78.22% 71.33% 70.95% 70.77%
loss penalizes ‖ν1‖1 = ‖W1D1W2‖1, which effectively acts as a regularizer on the network with
weight . Because of this, the resulting networks (even those with large representational capacity),
are typically overregularized to the point that many filters/weights become identically zero (i.e., the
network capacity is not used).
To address this point, we advocate for using a robust cascade of networks: that is, we train a sequence
of robust classifiers, where later elements of the cascade are trained (and evaluated) only on those
examples that the previous elements of the cascade cannot certify (i.e., those examples that lie within
 of the decision boundary). This procedure is formally described in the Appendix in Algorithm 2.
4 Experiments
Dataset and Architectures We evaluate the techniques in this paper on two main datasets: MNIST
digit classification [LeCun et al., 1998] and CIFAR10 image classification [Krizhevsky, 2009].2 We
test on a variety of deep and wide convolutional architectures, with and without residual connec-
tions. All code for these experiments is available at https://github.com/locuslab/convex_
adversarial/. The small network is the same as that used in [Wong and Kolter, 2017], with
two convolutional layers of 16 and 32 filters and a fully connected layer of 100 units. The large
network is a scaled up version of it, with four convolutional layers with 32, 32, 64, and 64 filters,
and two fully connected layers of 512 units. The residual networks use the same structure used by
[Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016] with 4 residual blocks with 16, 16, 32, and 64 filters. We highlight
a subset of the results in Table 2, and briefly describe a few key observations below. We leave
more extensive experiments and details regarding the experimental setup in Appendix G, including
additional experiments on `2 perturbations. All results except where otherwise noted use random
projection of 50 dimensions.
2We fully realize the irony of a paper with “scaling" in the title that currently maxes out on CIFAR10
experiments. But we emphasize that when it comes to certifiably robust networks, the networks we consider here,
as we illustrate below in Table 1, are more than an order of magnitude larger than any that have been considered
previously in the literature. Thus, our emphasis is really on the potential scaling properties of these approaches
rather than large-scale experiments on e.g. ImageNet sized data sets.
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Figure 2: Training and testing robust error curves over epochs on the MNIST dataset using k
projection dimensions. The  value for training is scheduled from 0.01 to 0.1 over the first 20 epochs.
The projections force the model to generalize over higher variance, reducing the generalization gap.
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Figure 3: Robust error curves as we add models to the cascade for the CIFAR10 dataset on a small
model. The  value for training is scheduled to reach 2/255 after 20 epochs. The training curves are
for each individual model, and the testing curves are for the whole cascade up to the stage.
Summary of results For the different data sets and models, the final robust and nominal test errors
are given in Table 2. We emphasize that in all cases we report the robust test error, that is, our upper
bound on the possible test set error that the classifier can suffer under any norm-bounded attack (thus,
considering different empirical attacks is orthogonal to our main presentation and not something
that we include, as we are focused on verified performance). As we are focusing on the particular
random projections discussed above, all experiments consider attacks with bounded `∞ norm, plus
the ReLU networks highlighted above. On MNIST, the (non-cascaded) large model reaches a final
robust error of 3.7% for  = 0.1, and the best cascade reaches 3.1% error. This contrasts with the best
previous bound of 5.8% robust error for this epsilon, from [Wong and Kolter, 2017]. On CIFAR10,
the ResNet model achieves 46.1% robust error for  = 2/255, and the cascade lowers this to 36.4%
error. In contrast, the previous best verified robust error for this , from [Dvijotham et al., 2018], was
80%. While the robust error is naturally substantially higher for  = 8/255 (the amount typically
considered in empirical works), we are still able to achieve 71% provable robust error; for comparison,
the best empirical robust performance against current attacks is 53% error at  = 8/255 Madry et al.
[2017], and most heuristic defenses have been broken to beyond this error Athalye et al. [2018].
Number of random projections In the MNIST dataset (the only data set where it is trivial to
run exact training without projection), we have evaluated our approach using different projection
dimensions as well as exact training (i.e., without random projections). We note that using substan-
tially lower projection dimension does not have a significant impact on the test error. This fact is
highlighted in Figure 2. Using the same convolutional architecture used by Wong and Kolter [2017],
which previously required gigabytes of memory and took hours to train, it is sufficient to use only 10
random projections to achieve comparable test error performance to training with the exact bound.
Each training epoch with 10 random projections takes less than a minute on a single GeForce GTX
1080 Ti graphics card, while using less than 700MB of memory, achieving significant speedup and
memory reduction over Wong and Kolter [2017]. The estimation quality and the corresponding
speedups obtained are explored in more detail in Appendix E.6.
Cascades Finally, we consider the performance of the cascaded versus non-cascaded models. In all
cases, cascading the models is able to improve the robust error performance, sometimes substantially,
for instance decreasing the robust error on CIFAR10 from 46.1% to 36.4% for  = 2/255. However,
this comes at a cost as well: the nominal error increases throughout the cascade (this is to be expected,
since the cascade essentially tries to force the robust and nominal errors to match). Thus, there is
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substantial value to both improving the single-model networks and integrating cascades into the
prediction.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a general methodology for deriving dual networks from compositions
of dual layers based on the methodology of conjugate functions to train classifiers that are provably
robust to adversarial attacks. Importantly, the methodology is linearly scalable for ReLU based
networks against `∞ norm bounded attacks, making it possible to train large scale, provably robust
networks that were previously out of reach, and the obtained bounds can be improved further
with model cascades. While this marks a significant step forward in scalable defenses for deep
networks, there are several directions for improvement. One particularly important direction is
better architecture development: a wide range of functions and activations not found in traditional
deep residual networks may have better robustness properties or more efficient dual layers that also
allow for scalable training. But perhaps even more importantly, we also need to consider the nature
of adversarial perturbations beyond just norm-bounded attacks. Better characterizing the space of
perturbations that a network “should” be resilient to represents one of the major challenges going
forward for adversarial machine learning.
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A Conjugates and lower bounds with duality
A.1 Conjugates of the joint indicator function
Here, we derive a lower bound on
∑k
i=2 χi(z1:i). It is mathematically convenient to introduce
addition variables zˆ1:k such that zˆi = zi for all i = 1, . . . , k, and rephrase it as the equivalent
constrained optimization problem.
min
z1:k−1,zˆ2:k
0
subject to zˆi =
i−1∑
j=1
fij(zj) for i = 2, . . . , k
zi = zˆi for i = 1, . . . , k
(14)
Note that we do not optimize over zˆ1 and zk yet, to allow for future terms on the inputs and outputs
of the network, so this is analyzing just the network structure. We introduce Lagrangian variables
ν1:k, νˆ2:k to get the following Lagrangian:
L(z1:k, zˆ1:k, ν1:k, νˆ2:k) =
k∑
i=2
νˆTi
zˆi − i−1∑
j=1
fij(zj)
+ k∑
i=1
νTi (zi − zˆi) (15)
Grouping up terms by zi, zˆi and rearranging the double sum results in the following expression:
L(z1:k, zˆ1:k, ν1:k, νˆ2:k) = −νT1 zˆ1 +
k∑
i=2
(νˆi − νi)T zˆi +
k∑
i=1
νTi zi − k∑
j=i+1
νˆTj fji(zi)
 (16)
From the KKT stationarity conditions for the derivative with respect to zˆi, we know that νˆi = νi.
Also note that in the summand, the last term for i = k has no double summand, so we move it out for
clarity.
L(z1:k, ν1:k) = −νT1 zˆ1 + νTk zk +
k−1∑
i=1
νTi zi − k∑
j=i+1
νTj fji(zi)
 (17)
Finally, we minimize over zi for i = 2, . . . , k − 1 to get the conjugate form for the lower bound via
weak duality.
L(z1:k, ν1:k) ≥ −νT1 zˆ1 + νTk zk +
k−1∑
i=1
min
zi
νTi zi − k∑
j=i+1
νTj fji(zi)

= −νT1 zˆ1 + νTk zk −
k−1∑
i=1
max
zi
−νTi zi + k∑
j=i+1
νTj fji(zi)

= −νT1 z1 + νTk zk −
k−1∑
i=1
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k)
(18)
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we rewrite the primal problem by bringing the function and input constraints into the objective
with indicator functions I . We can then apply Lemma 1 to get the following lower bound on the
adversarial problem:
maximize
ν1:k
minimize
z1,zk
(cT + νk)
T zk + IB(x)(z1)− νT1 z1 −
k−1∑
i=1
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k) (19)
Minimizing over z1 and zk, note that
min
zˆk
(c+ νk)
T zˆk = −I(νk = −c)
min
zˆ1
IB(x)(z1)− νT1 z1 = −I∗B(x)(ν1)
(20)
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Note that if B(x) = {x+ ∆ : ‖∆‖ ≤ } for some norm, then I∗B(x)(ν1) = νT1 x+ ‖ν1‖∗ where ‖ · ‖
is the dual norm, but any sort of input constraint can be used so long as its conjugate can be bounded.
Finally, the last term can be bounded with the dual layer:
min
zi
νTi zi −
k∑
j=i+1
νTj fji(zi) = −χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k) ≥ −hi(νi:k) subject to νi =
k∑
j=i+1
gij(νj)
(21)
Combining these all together, we get that the adversarial problem from Equation 2 is lower bounded
by
maximize
ν
− νT1 x− ‖ν1‖∗ −
k−1∑
i=1
hi(νi:k)
subject to νk = −c
νi =
k∑
j=i+1
gij(νj)
(22)
B Dual layers
In this section, we derive the dual layers for standard building blocks of deep learning.
B.1 Linear operators
Suppose fi(zi) = Wizi + bi for some linear operator Wi and bias terms bi. Then,
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi + (Wizi + bi)T νi+1
= max
zi
zTi (W
T
i νi+1 − νi) + bTi νi+1
= max
zi
I(νi = W
T
i νi+1) + b
T
i νi+1
= bTi νi+1 subject to νi = W
T
i νi+1
(23)
B.2 Residual linear connections
Suppose fi(zi, zj) = Wizi + zj + bi and zj+1 = Wjzj + bj for some j < i− 1 for linear operators
Wi,Wj and bias term bi, bj . Then,
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi + (Wizi + bi)T νi+1
= bTi νi+1 subject to νi = W
T
i νi+1
(24)
and
χ∗i (−νj , νj+1) = max
zj
−zTj νj + zTj νi + (Wjzj + bj)T νj+1
= bTj νj subject to νj = W
T
j νj+1 + νi
(25)
B.3 ReLU activations
The proof here is the same as that presented in Appendix A3 of Wong and Kolter [2017], however we
reproduce a simplified version here for the reader. The conjugate function for the ReLU activation is
the following:
χ∗(−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi + max(zi, 0)νi+1 (26)
Suppose we have lower and upper bounds `i, ui on the input zi. If ui ≤ 0, then max(zi, 0) = 0, and
so
χ∗(−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi = 0 subject to νi = 0 (27)
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Otherwise, if `i ≥ 0, then max(zi, 0) = zi and we have
χ∗(−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi + zTi νi+1 = 0 subject to νi = νi+1 (28)
Lastly, suppose `i < 0 < ui. Then, we can upper bound the conjugate by taking the maximum over a
convex outer bound of the ReLU, namely Si = {(zi, zi+1) : zi+1 ≥ 0, zi+1 ≥ zi,−ui  zi + (ui −
`i) zi+1 ≤ −ui  `i}, where  denotes element-wise multiplication:
χ∗(−νi, νi+1) ≤ maxSi −z
T
i νi + z
T
i+1νi+1 (29)
The maximum must occur either at the origin (0, 0) or along the line −uijzij + (uij − `ij)zi+1,j =
−uij`ij , so we can upper bound it again with
χ∗(−νij , νi+1,j) ≤ max
zij
[
−zijνij +
(
uij
uij − `ij zij −
uij`ij
uij − `ij
)
νi+1,j
]
+
= max
zij
[(
uij
uij − `ij νi+1,j − νij
)
zij − uij`ij
uij − `ij νi+1,j
]
+
=
[
− uij`ij
uij − `ij νi+1,j
]
+
subject to νij =
uij
uij − `ij νi+1,j
= −`ij [νij ]+ subject to νij =
uij
uij − `ij νi+1,j
(30)
Let I−i , I+i , I and Di be as defined in the corollary. Combining these three cases together, we get
the final upper bound:
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k) ≤ −
∑
j∈Ii
`i,j [νi,j ]+ subject to νi = Diνi+1 (31)
B.4 Hardtanh
Here, we derive a dual layer for the hardtanh activation function. The hard tanh activation function is
given by
hardtanh(x) =

−1 for x < −1
x for −1 ≤ x ≤ 1
1 for x > 1
(32)
Since this is an activation function (and has no skip connections), we only need to bound the following:
χ∗(−νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−zTi νi + hardtanh(zi)T νi+1 (33)
Given lower and upper bounds ` and u, we can use a similar convex relaxation as that used for ReLU
and decompose this problem element-wise (we will now assume all terms are scalars for notational
simplicity), so we have
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
zi,zi+1∈S
−ziνi + zi+1νi+1 (34)
where S is the convex relaxation. The exact form of the relaxation depends on the values of ` and
u, and we proceed to derive the dual layer for each case. We depict the relaxation where u > 1 and
` < −1 in Figure 4, and note that the remaining cases are either triangular relaxations similar to the
ReLU case or exact linear regions.
B.4.1 u > 1, ` < −1
If u > 1 and ` < −1, we can use the relaxation given in Figure 4. The upper bound goes through the
points (`,−1) and (1, 1) while the lower bound goes through the points (−1,−1) and (u, 1). The
slope of the first one is 21−` and the slope of the second one is
2
u+1 , so we have either
zi+1 =
2
1− ` (zi − 1) + 1, zi+1 =
2
u+ 1
(zi + 1)− 1 (35)
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Figure 4: Convex relaxation of hardtanh given lower and upper bounds ` and u.
Taking the maximum over these two cases, we have our upper bound of the conjugate is
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
(
−ziνi +
(
2
1− ` (zi − 1) + 1
)
νi+1,−ziνi +
(
2
u+ 1
(zi + 1)− 1
)
νi+1
)
(36)
Simplifying we get
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
(
zi
(
−νi + 2
1− `νi+1
)
+
(
1− 2
1− `
)
νi+1,
zi
(
−νi + 2
u+ 1
νi+1
)
+
(
2
u+ 1
− 1
)
νi+1
) (37)
So each case becomes
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
((
1− 2
1− `
)
νi+1 subject to νi =
2
1− `νi+1 ,(
2
u+ 1
− 1
)
νi+1 subject to νi =
2
u+ 1
νi+1
) (38)
As a special case, note that when u = −`, we have
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤
∣∣∣∣(1− 21 + u
)
νi+1
∣∣∣∣ subject to νi = 21 + uνi+1 (39)
This dual layer is linear, and so we can continue to use random projections for efficient bound
estimation.
B.4.2 u ≤ −1
Then, S = {zi+1 = −1} and so
χ∗(νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−ziνi − νi+1 = −νi+1 subject to νi = 0 (40)
B.4.3 ` ≥ 1
Then, S = {zi+1 = 1} and so
χ∗(νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−ziνi + νi+1 = νi+1 subject to νi = 0 (41)
B.4.4 ` ≥ −1, u ≤ 1
Then, S = {zi+1 = zi} and so
χ∗(νi, νi+1) = max
zi
−ziνi + ziνi+1 = 0 subject to νi = νi+1 (42)
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B.4.5 ` ≤ −1,−1 ≤ u ≤ 1
Here, our relaxation consists of the triangle above the hardtanh function. Then, the maximum
occurs either on the line zi+1 = 1+uu−` (zi − `) − 1 or at (−1,−1). This line is equivalent to
zi+1 =
1+u
u−` zi −
(
1+u
u−` `+ 1
)
, and the point (−1,−1) has objective value νi − νi+1, so we get
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
zi
−ziνi + 1 + u
u− ` ziνi+1 −
(
1 + u
u− ` `+ 1
)
νi+1 (43)
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
(
−
(
1 + u
u− ` `+ 1
)
νi+1, νi − νi+1
)
subject to νi =
1 + u
u− ` νi+1 (44)
B.4.6 −1 ≤ ` ≤ 1, 1 ≤ u
Here, our relaxation consists of the triangle below the hardtanh function. Then, the maximum
occurs either on the line zi+1 = 1−`u−` (zi − `) + ` or at (1, 1). This line is equivalent to zi+1 =
1−`
u−`zi −
(
1−`
u−``− `
)
, and at the point (1, 1) has objective value −νi + νi+1, so we get
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
zi
−ziνi + 1− `
u− `ziνi+1 −
(
1− `
u− ``− `
)
νi+1 (45)
χ∗(νi, νi+1) ≤ max
(
−
(
1− `
u− ``− `
)
νi+1,−νi + νi+1
)
subject to νi =
1− `
u− `νi+1 (46)
B.5 Batch normalization
As mentioned before, we only consider the case of batch normalization with a fixed mean and
variance. This is true during test time, and at training time we can use the batch statistics as a heuristic.
Let µi, σi be the fixed mean and variance statistics, so batch normalization has the following form:
BN(zi) = γ
xi − µi√
σ2i + 
+ β (47)
where γ, β are the batch normalization parameters. Then,
zi = γ
zˆi − µ√
σ2 + 
+ β = Dizi + di (48)
where Di+1 = diag
(
γ√
σ2+
)
and di+1 = β− µ√σ2+ . and so we can simply plug this into the linear
case to get
χ∗i (−νi, νi+1:k) = dTi νi+1 subject to νi = Diνi+1 (49)
Note however, that batch normalization has the effect of shifting the activations to be centered more
around the origin, which is exactly the case in which the robust bound becomes looser. In practice,
we find that while including batch normalization may improve convergence, it reduces the quality of
the bound.
C Cascade construction
The full algorithm for constructing cascades as we describe in the main text is shown in Algorithm 2.
To illustrate the use of the cascade, Figure 5 shows a two stage cascade on a few data points in two
dimensional space. The boxes denote the adversarial ball around each example, and if the decision
boundary is outside of the box, the example is certified.
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Algorithm 2 Training robust cascade of k networks and making predictions
input: Initialized networks f1, . . . , fk, training examples X, y, robust training procedure denoted
RobustTrain, test example x∗
for i = 1, . . . , k do
fi := RobustTrain(fi, X, y) // Train network
// remove certified examples from dataset
X, y := {xi, yi : J(x, g(ef(xi) − eytarg )) > 0, ∀ytarg 6= f(xi)}
end for
for i = 1, . . . , k do
if J(x, g(efi(x∗) − eytarg )) < 0 ∀ytarg 6= fi(x∗) then
output: fi(x∗) // return label if certified
end if
end for
output: no certificate
Figure 5: An example of a two stage cascade. The first model on the left can only robustly classify
three of the datapoints. After removing the certified examples, the remaining examples can now
easily be robustly classified by a second stage classifier.
D Estimation using Cauchy random projections
D.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Estimating ‖νˆ1‖1,: Recall the form of νˆ1,
νˆ1 = IW
T
1 D2W
T
2 . . . DnW
T
n = g(I)
where we include the identity term to make explicit the fact that we compute this by passing an
identity matrix through the network g. Estimating this term is straightforward: we simply pass in a
Cauchy random matrix R, and take the median absolute value:
‖νˆ1‖1,: ≈ median(|RWT1 D2WT2 . . . DnWTn |) = median(|g(R)|)
where the median is taken over the minibatch axis.
Estimating
∑
i[νi,:]+ Recall the form of ν = νj for some layer j,
νj = IDjW
T
j . . . DnW
T
n = gj(I)
Note that for a vector x, ∑
i
[x]+ =
‖x‖1 + 1Tx
2
So we can reuse the `1 approximation from before to get∑
i
[νi,:]+ =
‖ν‖1,: + 1T ν
2
≈ |median(gj(R)) + gj(1
T )|
2
which involves using the same median estimator and also passing in a single example of ones through
the network.
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Estimating
∑
i∈I `i[νi,:]+ The previous equation, while simple, is not exactly the term in the
objective; there is an addition `1 factor for each row, and we only add rows in the I set. However, we
can deal with this by simply passing in a modified input to the network, as we will see shortly:∑
i∈I
`i[νi,:]+ =
∑
i∈I
`i
|νi,:|+ νi,:
2
=
1
2
(∑
i∈I
`i|νi,:|+
∑
i∈I
`iνi,:
)
=
1
2
(∑
i∈I
`i|gj(I)i|+
∑
i∈I
`igj(I)i
) (50)
Note that since gj is just a linear function that does a forward pass through the network, for any
matrix A,B,
Agj(B) = ABDjW
T
j . . . DnW
T
n = gj(AB).
So we can take the multiplication by scaling terms ` to be an operation on the input to the network
(note that we assume `i < 0, which is true for all i ∈ I)∑
i∈I
`i[νi,:]+ =
1
2
(
−
∑
i∈I
|gj(diag(`))i|+
∑
i∈I
gj(diag(`))i
)
(51)
Similarly, we can view the summation over the index set I as a summation after multiplying by an
indicator matrix 1I which zeros out the ignored rows. Since this is also linear, we can move it to be
an operation on the input to the network.∑
i∈I
`i[νi,:]+ =
1
2
(
−
∑
i
|gj(1I diag(`))i|+
∑
i
gj(1I diag(`))i
)
(52)
Let the linear, preprocessing operation be h(X) = X1I diag(`) so
h(I) = 1I diag(`).
Then, we can observe that the two terms are simply an `1,: operation and a summation of the network
output after applying gj to h(I) (where in the latter case, since everything is linear we can take the
summation inside both g and h to make it gj(h(1T ))):∑
i∈I
`i[νi,:]+ =
1
2
(−‖gj(h(I))‖1,: + gj(h(1T ))) (53)
The latter term is cheap to compute, since we only pass a single vector. We can approximate the first
term using the median estimator on the compound operations g ◦ h for a Cauchy random matrix R:∑
i∈I
`i[νi,:]+ ≈ 1
2
(−median(|gj(h(R))|) + gj(h(1T ))) (54)
The end result is that this term can be estimated by generating a Cauchy random matrix, scaling its
terms by ` and zeroing out columns in I, then passing it through the network and taking the median.
h(R) can be computed for each layer lower bounds `, and cached to be computed for the next layer,
similar to the non-approximate case.
E High probability bounds
In this section, we derive high probability certificates for robustness against adversarial examples.
Recall that the original certificate is of the form
J(g(c, α)) < 0,
so if this holds we are guaranteed that the example cannot be adversarial. What we will show is an
equivalent high probability statement: for δ > 0, with probability at least (1− δ),
J(g(c, α)) ≤ J˜(g(c, α))
where J˜ is equivalent to the original J but using a high probability `1 upper bound. Then, if
J˜(g(c, α)) < 0 then with high probability we have a certificate.
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E.1 High probability bounds using the geometric estimator
While the median estimator is a good heuristic for training, it is still only an estimate of the bound.
At test time, it is possible to create a provable bound that holds with high probability, which may be
desired if computing the exact bound is computationally impossible.
In this section, we derive high probability certificates for robustness against adversarial examples.
Recall that the original certificate is of the form
J(g(c, α)) < 0,
so if this holds we are guaranteed that the example cannot be adversarial. What we will show is an
equivalent high probability statement: for δ > 0, with probability at least (1− δ),
J(g(c, α)) ≤ J˜(g(c, α))
where J˜ is equivalent to the original J but using a high probability upper bound on the `1 norm.
Then, if J˜(g(c, α)) < 0 then with high probability we have a certificate.
E.2 Tail bounds for the geometric estimator
From Li et al. [2007], the authors also provide a geometric mean estimator which comes with high
probability tail bounds. The geometric estimator is
‖νˆ1‖1,j ≈
k∏
i=1
|g(R)i,j |1/k
and the relevant lower tail bound on the `1 norm is
P
(
1
1− 
k∏
i=1
|g(R)i,j |1/k ≤ ‖νˆ1‖1,j
)
≤ exp
(
−k 
2
GL,gm
)
(55)
where
GL,gm =
2(
− 12 log
(
1 +
(
2
pi log(1− )
)2)
+ 2pi tan
−1 ( 2
pi log(1− )
)
log(1− )
)
Thus, if exp
(
−k 2GL,gm
)
≤ δ, then with probability 1− δ we have that
‖νˆ1‖1,j ≤ 1
1− 
k∏
i=1
|g(R)i,j |1/k = geo(R)
which is a high probability upper bound on the `1 norm.
E.3 Upper bound on J(g(c, α))
In order to upper bound J(g(c, α)), we must apply the `1 upper bound for every `1 term. Let
n1, . . . , nk denote the number of units in each layer of a k layer neural network, then we enumerate
all estimations as follows:
1. The `1 norm computed at each intermediary layer when computing iterative bounds. This
results in n2 + · · ·+ nk−1 estimations.
2. The
∑
j∈Ii `i,j [νi,j ]+ term for each i = 2, . . . , k − 1, computed at each intermediary layer
when computing the bounds. This results in n3 + 2n4 + · · ·+ (k − 3)nk−1.
In total, this is n2 + 2n3 + · · ·+ (k− 2)nk−1 = N total estimations. In order to say that all of these
estimates hold with probability 1− δ, we can do the following: we bound each estimate in Equation
55 with probability δ/N , and use the union bound over all N estimates. We can then conclude that
with probability at most δ, any estimate is not an upper bound, and so with probability 1− δ we have
a proper upper bound.
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E.4 Achieving δ/N tail probability
There is a problem here: if δ/N is small, then  becomes large, and the bound gets worse. In fact,
since  < 1, when k is fixed, there’s actually a lower limit to how small δ/N can be.
To overcome this problem, we take multiple samples to reduce the probability. Specifically, instead
of directly using the geometric estimator, we use the maximum over multiple geometric estimators
maxgeo(R1, . . . , Rm) = max(geo(R1), . . . , geo(Rm)),
where Ri are independent Cauchy random matrices. If each one has a tail probability of δ, then the
maximum has a tail probability of δm, which allows us to get arbitrarily small tail probabilities at a
rate exponential in m.
E.5 High probability tail bounds for network certificates
Putting this altogether, let δ > 0, let N > 0 be the number of estimates needed to calculate a
certificate, and let m be the number of geometric estimators to take a maximum over. Then with
probability (1− δ), if we bound the tail probability for each geometric estimate with δˆ = ( δN )1/m,
then we have an upper bound on the certificate.
MNIST example As an example, suppose we use the MNIST network from Wong and Kolter
[2017]. Then, let δ = 0.01, m = 10, and note that N = 6572. Then, δˆ = 0.26, which we can achieve
by using k = 200 and  = 0.22.
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Figure 6: Histograms of the relative error of the median estimator for 10 (top), 50 (middle), and 100
(bottom) projections, for a (left) random and (right) robustly trained convolutional layer.
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Figure 7: Timing (top) and memory in MB (bottom) plots for a single 3 by 3 convolutional layer to
evaluate 10 MNIST sized examples with minibatch size 1, averaged over 10 runs. The number of
hidden units is varied by increasing the number of filters. On a single Titan X, the exact method runs
out of memory at 52,800 hidden units, whereas the random projections scales linearly at a slope of
2.26× 10−7 seconds per hidden unit, up to 0.96 seconds for 4,202,240 hidden units.
E.6 Estimation quality and speedup
In this section, we discuss the empirical quality and speedup of the median estimator for `1 estimation
(for a more theoretical understanding, we direct the reader to Li et al. [2007]). In Figure 6, we plot
the relative error of the median estimator for varying dimensions on both an untrained and a trained
convolutional layer, and see that regardless of whether the model is trained or not, the distribution
of the estimate is normally distributed with decreasing variance for larger projections, and without
degenerate cases. This matches the theoretical results derived in Li et al. [2007].
In Figure 7, we benchmark the time and memory usage on a convolutional MNIST example to
demonstrate the performance improvements. While the exact bound takes time and memory that is
quadratic in the number of hidden units, the median estimator is instead linear, allowing it to scale up
to millions of hidden units whereas the exact bound runs out of memory out at 50,280 hidden units.
F AutoDual
In this section, we describe our generalization of the bounds computation algorithm from [Wong and
Kolter, 2017] to general networks using dual layers, which we call AutoDual.
Efficient construction of the dual network via linear dual operators The conjugate form, and
consequently the dual layer, for certain activations requires knowing lower and upper bounds for the
pre-activations, as was done for ReLU activations in Algorithm 1 of Wong and Kolter [2017]. While
the bound in Equation 7 can be immediately used to compute all the bounds on intermediate nodes of
the network one layer at a time, this requires performing a backwards pass through the dual network
whenever we need to compute the bounds. However, if the operators gij of the dual layers are all
affine operators gij(νi+1) = ATijνi+1 for some affine operator Aij , we can apply a generalization
of the lower and upper bound computation found in Wong and Kolter [2017] to compute all lower
and upper bounds, and consequently the dual layers, of the entire network with a single forward pass
in a layer-by-layer fashion. With the lower and upper bounds, we can also use the same algorithm
to automatically construct the dual network. The resulting algorithm, which we call AutoDual, is
described in Algorithm 3.
In practice, we can perform several layer-specific enhancements on top of this algorithm. First, many
of the Aji operators will not exist simply because most architectures (with a few exceptions) don’t
have a large number of skip connections, so these become no ops and can be ignored. Second, we
can lazily skip the computation of layer-wise bounds until necessary, e.g. for constructing the dual
layer of ReLU activations. Third, since many of the functions hj in the dual layers are functions
of BT νi for some matrix B and some i ≥ j, we can initialize ν(i)i with B instead of the identity
matrix, typically passing a much smaller matrix through the dual network (in many cases, B is a
single vector).
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Algorithm 3 Autodual: computing the bounds and dual of a general network
input: Network operations fij , data point x, ball size 
// initialization
ν
(1)
1 := I
`2 := x− 
u2 := x+ 
for i = 2, . . . , k − 1 do
// initialize new dual layer
Create dual layer operators Aji and hi from fji, `j and uj for all j ≤ i
ν
(i)
i := I .
// update all dual variables
for j = 1, . . . , i− 1 do
ν
(i)
j :=
∑j−1
k=1Akiν
(k)
j
end for
// compute new bounds
`i+1 := x
T ν
(i)
1 − ‖ν(i)1 ‖: +
∑i
j=1 hj(ν
(i)
j , . . . , ν
(i)
i )
ui+1 := x
T ν
(i)
1 + ‖ν(i)1 ‖: −
∑i
j=1 hj(−ν(i)j , . . . ,−ν(i)i )
// ‖ · ‖: for a matrix here denotes the norm of all rows
end for
output: bounds {`i, ui}ki=2, dual layer operators Ajk, hi
G Experiments
In this section, we provide more details on the experimental setup, as well as more extensive
experiments on the effect of model width and model depth on the performance that were not
mentioned above.
We use a parameter k to control the width and depth of the architectures used in the following
experiments. The Wide(k) networks have two convolutional layers of 4× k and 8× k filters followed
by a 128× k fully connected layer. The Deep(k) networks have k convolutional filters with 8 filters
followed by k convolutional filters with 16 filters.
Downsampling Similar to prior work, in all of our models we use strided convolutional layers with
4 by 4 kernels to downsample. When downsampling is not needed, we use 3 by 3 kernels without
striding.
G.1 MNIST
Experimental setup For all MNIST experiments, we use the Adam optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.001 with a batch size of 50. We schedule  starting from 0.01 to the desired value over the first
20 epochs, after which we decay the learning rate by a factor of 0.5 every 10 epochs for a total of 60
epochs.
Model width and depth We find that increasing the capacity of the model by simply making the
network deeper and wider on MNIST is able boost performance. However, when the model becomes
overly wide, the test robust error performance begins to degrade due to overfitting. These results are
shown in Table 3.
G.2 CIFAR10
Experimental setup For all CIFAR10 experiments, we use the SGD optimizer with a learning rate
of 0.05 with a batch size of 50. We schedule  starting from 0.001 to the desired value over the first
20 epochs, after which we decay the learning rate by a factor of 0.5 every 10 epochs for a total of 60
epochs.
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Table 3: Results on different widths and depths for MNIST
Dataset Model Epsilon Robust error Error
MNIST Wide(1) 0.1 6.51% 2.27%
MNIST Wide(2) 0.1 5.46% 1.55%
MNIST Wide(4) 0.1 4.94% 1.33%
MNIST Wide(8) 0.1 4.79% 1.32%
MNIST Wide(16) 0.1 5.27% 1.36%
MNIST Deep(1) 0.1 5.28% 1.78%
MNIST Deep(2) 0.1 4.37% 1.28%
MNIST Deep(3) 0.1 4.20% 1.15%
Table 4: Results on MNIST, and CIFAR10 with small networks, large networks, residual networks,
and cascaded variants for `2 perturbations.
Single model error Cascade error
Dataset Model Epsilon Robust Standard Robust Standard
MNIST Small, Exact 1.58 56.48% 11.86% 24.42% 19.57%
MNIST Small 1.58 56.32% 13.11% 25.34% 20.93%
MNIST Large 1.58 55.47% 11.88% 26.16% 24.97%
CIFAR10 Small 36/255 53.73% 44.72% 50.13% 48.64%
CIFAR10 Large 36/255 49.40% 40.24% 41.36% 41.16%
CIFAR10 Resnet 36/255 48.04% 38.80% 41.44% 41.28%
H Results for `2 perturbations
We run similar experiments for `2 perturbations on the input instead of `∞ perturbations, which
amounts to replacing the `1 norm in the objective with the `2 norm. This can be equivalently scaled
using random normal projections [Vempala, 2005] instead of random Cauchy projections. We use
the same network architectures as before, and pick 2 such that the volume of an `2 ball with radius
2 is approximately the same as the volume of an `∞ ball with radius ∞. A simple conversion (an
overapproximation within a constant factor) is:
2 =
√
d
pi
∞.
For MNIST, we take an equivalent volume to ∞ = 0.1. This ends up being 2 = 1.58, and note that
within the dataset, the minimum `2 distance between any two digits is at least 3.24, so 2 is roughly
half of the minimum distance between any two digits. For CIFAR we take an equivalent volume to
∞ = 2/255, which ends up being 2 = 36/255.
The results for the complete suite of experiments are in Table 4, and we get similar trends in robustness
for larger and cascaded models to that of `∞ perturbations.
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